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ABSTRACT 
 
The study aims to explore why some societies are more innovative than others in high-
technology sectors. Following a crossvergence perspective, we generate nine causal conditions 
by accommodating both cultural and institutional varieties: uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, 
individualism and power distance as culture indicators, and union density, skill development, 
market capitalization to credit, prevalence of cluster and state dominance as institutional 
indicators. Applying the configurational approach, we conducted fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA) on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) member countries. We confirm the equal importance of both cultural and institutional 
mechanisms as contributors to national innovativeness, and identify equifinal configurations 
of cultural and institutional varieties as leading to a high-tech society. The implication is that a 
society can adjust or develop various cultural and/or institutional conditions to maintain or 
create leadership in innovation.  
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1. Introduction 
      Why are some societies more innovative than others in high-technology sectors? Two 
decades ago, a culturalist, Shane (1992), made a landmark attempt to answer this meaningful 
research question. Embracing Hofstede’s (1980) culture dimension theory, Shane (1992, 1993, 
1995) concluded that some societies might have a cultural comparative advantage in 
inventiveness, and the same cultural values (e.g., uncertainty acceptance, individualism and the 
lack of power distance) that operate on the national level also operate on the firm level, leading 
those companies and countries with innovative cultures to invent more than do others. Shane’s 
empirical studies contribute in two aspects: establishing the relationship between national 
culture and innovation, and exploring the configurational nature of culture (cf., Efrat, 2014; 
Hofstede, 2006, 2011; Hofstede et al., 1990).  
      In contrast to culturalists, institutionalists argue for the importance of regulatory, political, 
and economic structures in contributing to building innovative societies. Given that a nation or 
state remains the primary unit in governing economic activities (Allen, 2012), scholars have 
employed a number of concepts and frameworks to describe the feature and form of an 
innovative society, such as “national innovation systems” (NIS) (Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 
2007; Rothberg, 1995; Samara et al., 2012), “national business systems” (Hotho, 2014; Whitley, 
1992, 1999, 2007), “social systems of innovation and production” (Amable, 2003), or “varieties 
of capitalism” (Clausen, 2014; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Jackson and Deeg, 2008). In these 
frameworks, institutional characteristics are deemed as either antecedents or determinants 
individually, or as causal conditions together that lead to configurational solutions to enhancing 
innovation.   
      Nevertheless, the literatures on the cultural perspective and institutional perspective of 
national innovation performance have developed rather independently, and neither of the 
approaches has been supported by consistent empirical evidence. One reason might be that 
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scholars tend to conflate culture and institutions in various ways. Culturalists claim that cultural 
difference is the root of institutional variations (e.g., Javidan et al., 2006). Institutionists argue 
that culture is under the conceptual umbrella of “institution”. Various streams of institutional 
theories commonly treat culture – more specifically shared values and non-codified standards 
– as an important reflection of a country’s informal institutions (Holmes et al., 2013; North, 
1990; Peng et al., 2008). However, scholars subscribing to the crossvergence view (Ralston et 
al., 1997) suggest that in fact culture and institution co-evolve and affect each other in a path-
dependent way (cf., Ralston, 2008; Witt, 2008) so as to create a unique set of managerial values 
in a country (Ralston et al., 1993). In light of these views, Taylor and Wilson (2012) called for 
research on the joint effect of culture and institutions on national innovation rates, because the 
effectiveness of institutions and cultural dimensions are conditional on each other. 
      Given that the logic linkages between cultural and institutional mechanisms and national 
innovation co-exist and are co-evolutionary, we follow a configurational approach for theory 
building, which has been increasingly adopted in business research (Crilly et al., 2012; Fiss, 
2007, 2011; Misangyi and Acharya, 2014; Misangyi et al., 2016). In contrast to the variance-
based approach, which aims to identify the deterministic condition under which the individual 
causal effect on the desired outcome is maximized, the configurational approach allows for 
equifinality and explores multiple causal pathways (or patterns) that lead to the same level of 
desired outcome (Fiss, 2007; Misangyi et al., 2016; Ragin, 2008). In our context, this approach 
enables us to capture various configurations of cultural and institutional varieties that work 
together to enhance national innovation outcome. Existing research has demonstrated the 
efficacy of the configurational approach for explaining complex social and organizational 
phenomena (e.g., Fiss, 2011; Misangyi and Acharya, 2014), as it acknowledges the 
interdependent nature of analytical units, where fit and competitive advantages frequently rest 
on the complementarities between multiple characteristics (e.g., Fiss, 2007, 2011). Porter (1990) 
4 
 
 
 
argued that economic activities are embedded in social activities. Since national innovation is 
an important aspect of economic activities, the core objective and main contribution of this 
study is to address how “social glue” binds both cultural and institutional elements together to 
build an innovative society – “one of the major research questions in the social sciences today” 
(Witt and Redding, 2009: 859).  
      The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the research 
background, and, briefly, both culture- and institution-based views on national innovation. 
Section 3 develops three major research propositions to be addressed by our data. Sections 4 
and 5 detail research design and results, respectively. Section 6 brings the paper to a close with 
some concluding implication points and an overview of study limitations and avenues for future 
research. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Hofstede’s culture dimensions 
      Culture is “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of 
one human group from another” (Hofstede, 1980: 21). In his watershed study, Hofstede (1980) 
examined four major culture dimensions, namely, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, 
individualism, and power distance, which can be used to detail similarities and differences of 
systems of societal norms and values shared by major groups of the population in 40 societies. 
Despite the emergence of other complementary works on culture (Schwartz, 1992; 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997), Hofstede’s framework of four culture dimensions 
has shown high validity and reliability. Some major replications (e.g., Merritt, 2000; Shane, 
1995), conducted decades after Hofstede’s (1980) work, support the original findings and 
suggest that the culture dimensions are still relevant today. Most countries’ cultures are 
enduring over time (cf. Inglehart and Baker, 2000), and the persistence of distinct cultural 
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dimensions are found to change together, so that their relative positions remain stable (Hofstede 
et al., 2010).   
      Embracing Hofstede’s culture dimension framework, Shane (1992, 1993, 1995) has 
conducted a number of empirical studies to provide evidence as to whether each of Hofestede’s 
culture dimensions can have a significant impact on national innovation (see details in 
Appendix 1 – Part A). Inspired by Shane (1992, 1993, 1995), other culturists, such as Rinne 
and colleagues (2012) and Taylor and Wislson (2012), have further pursued more empirical 
evidence in a similar vein.  
      Despite the efforts of previous scholars, the literature is yet to reach a consensus on which 
of the cultural dimensions promote innovation and whether the effects of these dimensions are 
consistent and robust across countries and time periods. The link between certain cultural 
dimensions and innovation is not well-established at the national level and is contradictory to 
the theoretical predictions. As culturalists primarily focus on individual values and the 
willingness to innovate, one might argue that, for such willingness and motivation to transform 
to action, they need to be combined with certain ways of organizing economic activities that 
create an environment conducive to undertaking innovation.  
2.2.Comparative institutional perspective 
The comparative institutional perspective addresses differences in socio-economic 
organization between countries (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1992, 1999; Jackson and 
Deeg, 2008). An underlying assumption is that countries may differ noticeably in how 
economic activity is organized and controlled, regardless of the level of institutional 
development (Whitley, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Comparative institutional scholars have 
shown that well-developed economies that have similar institutional development levels differ 
considerably in the dominant type of firms, their organizational capabilities and interests, and 
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their relations with other economic actors (Whitley, 1999, 2007). National institutional 
frameworks and policies influence the level of business-funded research and development 
(R&D) and the technological competitiveness of firms in a country (Carlsson, 2006; Herrera 
and Nieto, 2008; Senker, 1996), leading to different patterns of innovative activities (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). According to Hall and Soskice’s (2001) framework, liberal market economies 
(LME) countries (e.g., the US) specialize in radical innovation, while coordinated market 
economies (CME) countries (e.g., Germany) focus more on incremental innovation.  
      A central feature of comparative institutional perspective is that institutions in different 
societal domains, such as education systems, financial systems and the nature of market 
relations, are considered to be reciprocally constituted and path-dependent (Hotho and 
Pedersen, 2012; Whitley, 1992, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Thus, in well-developed 
countries, the constituent dimensions of institutions develop in a mutually reinforcing and 
interdependent way (Hotho and Pedersen, 2012; Whitley, 1992, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
According to Jackson and Deeg (2008: 557), institutions of well-developed countries generally 
form relatively stable and complementary configurations that help reproduce a distinctive 
economic logic, or particular “strategies, routine approaches to problems and shared decision 
rules that produce predictable patterns of behavior by actors within the system”.  
The present study focuses on five specific institutional dimensions in accordance with the 
comparative institutional framework developed by Whitley (1998, 1999), of which four 
dimensions are highlighted: the skill-development system, the characteristics of the financial 
system, the role assumed by the state, and the norms and values that resonate in work relations. 
Since the remaining dimension of “norms and values” largely refers to cultural indicators, we 
replace it with Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions discussed above. Five specific indicators of 
institutional dimensions, namely, union density, skill development, market capitalization to 
credit, prevalence of clusters and state dominance, are detailed in Appendix 1 – Part B.   
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      Researchers have found evidence of the specificity of national business systems and have 
concluded that various institutional dimensions collectively produce distinct ways of economic 
coordination, in accordance with the complementary patterns posited by the comparative 
institutional perspective (Hotho, 2014; Schneider et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the results also 
point to a neglected fact that those countries sharing the combination of institutional conditions 
for achieving strong innovation performance apparently belong with the same cultural cluster 
(Hotho, 2014; Ronen and Shenkar, 2013). Whilst institutionalists have predominantly focused 
on the comparison of one business system with another (Whitley, 2000), there are cases where 
two countries with similar economic organization do not match in the level of innovation 
performance (Schneider et al., 2010). It appears that an institutional regime only predisposes 
an economy to specializing in one type of innovation but does not necessarily guarantee the 
production of such innovations (Akkermans et al., 2009). Little is known as to whether 
institutional regimes need to be complemented by certain cultural values to promote innovative 
activities, or whether culture and institutions are interdependently developed and mutually 
reinforced. Moreover, it is posited that the trend of globalization may reduce the sectorial 
specialization of the business system within established political boundaries, given the co-
evolution of multinational enterprises and local institutions and the acquisition of capabilities 
from abroad (Allen, 2012; Cantwell et al., 2010). Culturalists, in contrast, would suggest 
otherwise, because the immobility of the workforce across borders determines that the 
innovation performance of high-tech industries in particular will continue to be shaped by the 
home-country cultural setting. Only by taking into account the crossvergence of both culture 
and institutions on innovation patterns and performance can we solve these puzzles.   
3. Research Propositions 
      Nine factors derived from the two distinguished but interconnected theoretical frameworks, 
namely, culture indicators (including (1) uncertainty avoidance, (2) masculinity, (3) 
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individualism, (4) power distance, and institutional indicators, including (5) union density, (6) 
skill development, (7) market capitalization to credit, (8) prevalence of cluster and (9) state 
dominance) were identified above as elements of the configurations of the culture-institution 
mechanism of a society’s innovation performance. Following the configurational approach of 
theory building (Crilly, 2011; Fiss, 2007, 2011), we posit that, rather than the independent 
effects of the identified factors, configurations of these factors are what drive societies to be 
innovative. We offer three propositions to guide the empirical analysis facilitated by the fsQCA 
technique (Crilly et al., 2012; Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008). 
3.1.Configuration as a joint causal effect 
      The management literature has derived two different opinions as to why one particular 
society is more innovative than another, even when a comparison is made between advanced 
economies (e.g., Hotho, 2014; Rinne et al., 2012; Shane, 1992, 1993; Schneider et al., 2010). 
However, the two theoretical thoughts are not necessary mutually exclusive. Landes (2000: 2) 
strongly argued that, “if we learn anything from the history of economic development, it is that 
culture makes almost all the difference”. Porter (2000: 14) agreed that “culture plays an 
unquestioned role in human behavior and progress”. Chui, Lloyd and Kwok (2002) confirmed 
that cultural influences provide a foundation that shapes economic activities (e.g., corporate 
capital structure). Further, Redding (2005) contended that the relationship between national 
culture and economic success can be co-evolutionary. The development of the institutional 
perspective has also paid attention to the role of culture but it only treats culture dimensions in 
aggregate as one pillar or aspect of institutions (North, 1990; Peng et al., 2008). For instance, 
the comparative institutional perspective highlights the norms and values that resonate in work 
relations as one of four co-existing institutional dimensions (Whitley, 1998, 1999). Moreover, 
some institutionalists (e.g., Holmes et al., 2011; North, 1990; Peng et al., 2008) distinguish 
institutions as formal and informal, the latter referring to culture.  
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      Acknowledging that the significance of the competing theoretical angles does not 
necessarily make the theory itself more powerful in explaining the reality, the crossvergence 
view holders, such as Redding (2005), explicitly emphasize that the culture school underlies 
institutions. So do institutionalists. Javidan et al. (2006: 908) claim that the relationships 
between wealth, national culture and other institutions are “so intertwined that they cannot be 
easily isolated”. Therefore, scholars (e.g., Ralston et al., 1997; Ralston, 2008; Witt, 2008) draw 
a conclusion that both institutional and cultural dimensions have an important influence on 
social matters. In particular, Witt and Redding (2009) combined both national cultures and 
institutional thinking to explain “the evolutionary trajectories of national business systems”. 
Derived from the crossvergence perspective, and the fact that there is a lack of empirical 
evidence of joint casual effect of cultural and institutional varieties on national innovation, we 
propose our first research proposition:  
Proposition 1. The effectiveness of national innovation requires the presence of both cultural 
and institutional mechanisms. 
3.2.Causal configuration equifinality  
      A unique advantage of applying the configurational approach using the fsQCA technique 
is of capturing the feature of equifinality, which is a situation where “a system can reach the 
same final state from different initial conditions and by a variety of different paths” (Fiss, 
2007:1181). As opposed to conventional econometric methods that tend to imply linearity, 
additive effects and unifinality, the configurational approach objects to the notion of an optimal 
solution and embraces nonlinearity and synergistic effects. Configurational equifinality 
emerges when organizations face multiple and sometimes conflicting functional demands that 
require prioritizing to obtain an achievable outcome level, and organizations differ in their 
functional prioritization, which leads to different structures that may generate the same or 
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similar levels of outcome (Gresov and Drazin, 1997). Analytically, such multiple causal 
pathways require the test of conjunctural causation (Schneider et al., 2010), which can be 
achieved by configurational comparative methods such as fsQCA (Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008).  
      Culture shapes, and in turn is shaped by, institutions (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Witt, 
2008). In the literature, scholars subscribing to the crossvergence view emphasize the intricate 
connection between culture and institutions (e.g., Javidan et al., 2006; Redding, 2005; Witt, 
2008; Witt and Redding, 2009) and suggest that the crux lies in the interactions between the 
two (Witt, 2008). In relation to national innovation performance, Taylor and Wilson (2012) 
conjecture that the effectiveness of different institutions (e.g., democracy, federalism, varieties 
of capitalism) in national innovation rates is conditional on different cultural values. We further 
argue that causal configuration equifinality allows for the possibility that multiple 
configurations of cultural and institutional dimensions can lead to the same level of national 
innovation performance. Fiss (2007) posits that a desired level of outcome can be achieved 
from different initial conditions and by a variety of different paths. In the context of national 
innovation, societies with distinct configurations of cultural and institutional varieties may 
adopt different national strategies to fulfill their aspiration to build an innovative society. 
Evidence has been found on the configuration of institutional varieties alone. Following the 
comparative institutional perspective (cf. Whitley, 1998, 1999), Hotho (2014) empirically 
confirms that several institutional configurations that include institutional varieties, such as 
union density, financial systems, state dominance and education systems, are conducive to 
innovation specialization in high-tech industries. For instance, it is found that high-tech 
innovation specialization can be promoted through a business system with deregulated labor 
markets and capital-based financing, but also facilitated by other business systems that feature 
little regulation, which can facilitate risk taking and knowledge dispersion through an equitable 
skill development systems (Hotho, 2014). We follow this approach to capture the possible 
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equifinal configurations of cultural and institutional varieties that lead to national innovation 
performance, and we propose: 
Proposition 2: There are equifinal configurations of cultural and institutional varieties that 
lead to an innovative society. 
3.3.Configuration with time effect 
      Culture is commonly understood as enduring social patterns (Hofstede, 1980). Yet this does 
not mean that it never changes, although it would conceivably take an extended period for any 
change to become observable (Hofstede et al., 2010; Inglehart and Baker, 2000). Similarly, 
institutionalists have shown that institutions go through periods of marked change as well as 
stability (Seo and Creed, 2002). Based on the institutional change perspective, Dacin, 
Goodstein and Scott (2002: 47) argue that institutional change is influenced by “social 
pressures associated with differentiation of groups, the existence of heterogeneous divergent 
or discordant beliefs and practices, and changes in laws or social expectations that might hinder 
the continuation of a practice”. The liberalizing initiatives of the European Union knocked 
down the barriers to trade and to the mobilization of employees, stimulating contemporary 
institutional changes (Hall and Thelen, 2009). It is argued that institutional changes are partly 
initiated by various agents of adjustment and particularly the government and firms in each 
country (Whitley, 2007). A prominent example of such endogenous institutional change is 
solidaristic wage bargaining in Sweden, where the movement toward centralized bargaining 
arrangements across export sectors unintendedly consolidated the bargaining position of 
unskilled workers, leaving less room for skilled labour (Pontusson and Swenson, 1996). The 
accumulation of firms’ “deviant” behaviour in pursuit of new competitive strategies calls for 
the government to realign the regulatory rules accordingly (Hall and Thelen, 2009). On the 
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other hand, institutional changes can also be triggered by a response to exogenous shocks 
(Whitley, 2007), like the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
      In a recent study examining the comparative institutions of 26 OECD countries, Schneider 
and Paunescu (2012) found that various institutional configurations that lead to a classification 
of LME and CME countries are not stable; for example, some commonly recognised CME 
countries, such as Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden (cf., Hall and Soskice, 2001), 
all moved from the CME model to closer to the LME model between 1990 and 2005. This 
finding provides empirical evidence that institutional varieties are changeable and adjustable 
over a relatively short period, although such liberalising efforts as decentralizing collective 
bargaining, neutralizing unions, reducing employment protection and promoting equity 
investments do not occur together or necessarily result in radical transformation of the 
dominant institutions (Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Whitley, 2007). Even during a period when 
the formal institutional infrastructure appears to remain stable, the coordination of economic 
activities may still be altered by firms and workers through defects in institutionalised practices 
or reinterpretation of existing rules (Hall and Thelen, 2009). Rather than centralized efforts, 
institutional change is a process of mutual adjustment to distributive concerns by various actors 
in order to retain the comparative institutional advantage of the nation state (Hall and Thelen, 
2009).  
      If both cultural dimensions and institutional elements can be altered proactively, the 
culture-institution mechanism may well be configurational. In other words, to achieve a 
strategic goal that the society desires (e.g., building an innovative society), the society can 
transform its cultural dimensions in the long run and institutional elements in the short run. For 
example, the increasing provision of “collective competition goods” such as highly trained 
workers and accessible capital by domestic agencies will help firms create organizational 
capabilities in relation to innovation (Crouch et al., 2001). These changes are particularly 
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probable and tend to be significant when the endogenous forces from the dominant institutional 
regimes complement shifts in the international environment (Whitley, 2007). However, due to 
the institutional interaction, in that whether a change in one dimension of institutions can 
produce a desired outcome depends on the structure and complementarity of other institutional 
arrangements (Hall and Thelen, 2009), different countries may have motivations for mandating 
and endorsing different institutional reforms. This is manifest in the fact that, despite a society’s 
ability to adjust institutional regimes over time, the move toward liberalization is not universal 
across OECD countries (Schneider and Paunescu, 2012). Thus, we posit our third proposition:  
Proposition 3. If cultural and institutional varieties are configurational, a society can adjust 
or develop its cultural and/or institutional conditions to maintain or create its innovation 
leadership from time to time.  
4. Method 
4.1.Research design 
      This research explores the combinations of Hofstede’s culture dimensions and the 
comparative institutional dimensions that exist among advanced economies to achieve high 
national innovation performance. Analytically, we follow a set-theoretic approach, utilizing the 
technique of fsQCA. Grounded in set theory, fsQCA is an analytic technique that allows for a 
detailed analysis of how causal conditions collectively contribute to an outcome in question 
(Crilly, 2011; Fiss, 2007, 2011; Misangyi et al., 2016; Ragin, 2008). The fsQCA technique is 
particularly suited for this study for three reasons. First, fsQCA enables the test of 
configurations as conjunctural causal effects, while traditional regression-based analysis is 
more suited for isolating an individual factor’s effect, that is, so-called “general linear reality” 
or “net effects thinking” (Misangyi et al., 2016; 3; Ragin 2008). In so doing, traditional 
regression-based analysis has channeled efforts towards building and testing theories shaped 
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by conceptions of “independent, additive, and symmetrical causality” (cf. Misangyi et al., 
2016), which, in our study context, is evident in Shane’s early efforts (e.g. 1992, 1993, 1995) 
in studying each individual Hofstede culture dimension influencing innovation. Given these 
different focuses, fsQCA is regarded as more analytically efficient than the regression approach 
in terms of detecting the collective influence of multiple causal conditions (Fiss, 2007; Ragin, 
2008). Second, fsQCA models the concept of equifinality, following the principle that multiple 
combinations of causal conditions, rather than a single optimal solution, can lead to the desired 
outcome (Cui et al., 2017; Misangyi et al., 2016; Schneider et al., 2010). It thus has the 
advantage of capturing causal configuration equifinality, which allows for discovering 
different types of national innovation systems based on the nexus of cultural and institutional 
varieties. Third, fsQCA is suited for analysis based on a small-to-medium sized sample (Ragin, 
2008), which is likely to be the case for studying country-level data with limited national 
varieties in scope and depth. 
4.2.Sample and data 
      To explore the crossvergence perspective of cultural and institutional varieties, and assess 
the validity of configurations leading to a national innovation leadership, this study samples 
the 30 OECD member states for the 2010-2011 test and 25 OECD member states for the 2004-
2005 test. The selection of OECD countries is for three reasons. First, developed market 
economies dominate in almost all key innovation indices and ranking systems. For example, 
by measuring patent applications worldwide, high-income and the upper middle-income 
countries (mainly OECD member states) occupy 60.3% and 36.4% of applications, 
respectively, in 2013, which also reflects their high R&D spending (WIPO, 2014). Second, 
institutional varieties derived from the comparative institutional perspective are generally 
applied to developed market economies with relatively stable societal institutions (Hotho, 2014; 
Judge et al., 2014; Schneider et al., 2010). Third, culture dimension data are overall consistently 
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available to OECD member states from the two major Hofstede culture value studies (his early 
stage one that was based on the IBM survey 1967-1973, and published in 1980; and his later 
work with reference to Minkov’s World Values Survey in 2010). The sample includes countries 
that are frequently flagged in the innovation literature, such as the United Kingdom (UK), the 
US, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the Nordic countries.  
      We selected 2005 and 2011 as our focal years for innovation performance, and 2004 and 
2010 for measuring causal conditions. We used the most recent data available before either 
2004-2005 or 2010-2011 if data for the two time periods were not yet available. The outcome 
variable was sourced from the 2005/2011 patent data in the OECD/EPO patent database. The 
culture dimension data were sourced from Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) for the 2010-
2011 test, while data presented in Hofstede (1980) were used for the 2004-2005 test, because 
these not only have construct measurement validity but are also regarded as the latest available 
data source for Hofstede’s culture indicators. Hofstede et al. (2010) argued that the culture 
dimension will not change frequently over decades.   
      The institutional indicators were measured from diversified data sources. The data source 
for Union Density is the ICTWSS database 4.0, which was compiled and measured by Visser 
(2013). Measuring the Strength of Education System is controversial in the literature. 
Researchers (e.g., Schneider et al., 2010; Zhang and Yang, 2006) have adopted two measures 
of the training system, namely, university training and occupational training, and conclude that 
LME countries are characterized by a high extent of university training, while CME countries 
feature a high degree of occupational training. The conclusion is ideological and debatable, 
because the quality of either university- or occupational-training institutions across countries 
is not able to be compared. For this reason, this study embraces the measurement adopted by 
Hotho (2014), who argued that strong education systems should overcome student social 
backgrounds and ensure an equitable distribution of learning opportunities and development 
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outcomes (cf., OECD, 2010). Therefore, in such a system, student performance is less affected 
by variation between schools than less-effective education systems. Therefore, this study 
adopts data collected from the OECD programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
database 2000 and 2009, because the PISA results generally predict the quality of a labour 
force one decade later in the country according to OECD longitudinal studies (cf., OECD, 
2014). The ratio of Market Capitalization to Credit was calculated from two data sources, 
namely, data on market capitalization obtained from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators and the Global Development Finance database 2004/2011. Data on private credit by 
deposit money banks were obtained from the World Bank Financial Structure dataset 
2004/2013. In this sense, scores above 1 indicate that the financial systems are more based on 
the capital market, while scores less than 1 reflect financial systems relying on credit. 
Pervasiveness of Clusters and the intermediary associations indicator was adopted from the 
Global Competitiveness Report (WEF, 2004, 2010), which measures how prevalent well-
developed and deep clusters (including research institutes and training providers) are in each 
country’s economy. The main data source for measuring State Dominance is also the Global 
Competitiveness Report (WEF, 2004, 2011), which has been a widely used source of 
institutional data (e.g., Hotho, 2014; Rao et al., 2005).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
4.3 Calibration 
      Outcome: The primary outcome of interest in our study is revealed in innovation 
specialization (RIS). The RIS index as used here reflects the share of patenting of a country in 
a sector relative to its share of patenting in all industries, and is a frequent measure of 
innovation specialization (e.g., Dunning, 1994; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hotho, 2014; Vertova, 
2001). Following Hotho (2014), the Balassa index of RIS in biotechnology, nanotechnology, 
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and information and communication technology uses patent data from the OECD/EPO patent 
database. We selected these sectors because they depend heavily on research outputs from 
OECD countries, in which cultural mechanisms and institutional varieties are often claimed to 
have either cultural or institutional comparative advantage (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Shane, 
1992, 1993). The literature (e.g., Dunning, 1994; Hall and Soskice, 2001) suggests that 
innovation activities rather than the value of innovations can reflect well on the national 
innovation flagship; we, therefore, adopt patent counts rather than forward citations. The 
equation of the RIS index is as follows:  
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑗 =
𝑃𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑖
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑗
∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖
 
      The nominator reflects EPO patent applications (P) from country j in sector i as a proportion 
of total EPO patent applications from country j. The denominator reflects the total number of 
EPO patent applications in sector i as a share of the total number of patent applications from 
the sample of OECD countries. An RIS value of more than 1 signifies that a country is relatively 
specialized in innovation in sector i. For the purpose of this study, we calculated a combined 
RIS country score for the biotechnology, nanotechnology and ICT sectors for both 2005 and 
2011. 
      In our research, the fuzzy-set measurement of RIS was based on Fiss’s (2011) calibration 
rules. Specifically, for the RIS in 2011, countries with RIS index above 1.04, such as the US 
and Canada, were considered full members (i.e., a score of 1) in the set. Scores between 0.82 
and 1.04, including the UK and Australia, were considered to have a high degree of 
membership at the 0.67 level. Scores between 0.59 and 0.82 received 0.33, which includes 
countries like Denmark and Greece. Countries with scores below 0.59, such as Italy and 
Norway, were coded as full non-membership (i.e., a score of 0) of the set. 
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      Culture Indicators: Based on raw data about national cultural dimensions, we assigned 
group membership to each country in each causal condition following Ragin’s (2008) 
technique: full membership (1), full non-membership (0), and the crossover point (0.5). Since 
all of our culture indicators are adopted from Hofstede’s national cultural dimensions, and they 
share the same scale of measurement in 2004 and 2010, we can use one fuzzy-set method to 
calibrate all of our culture indicators in both years. Specifically, for any of our four cultural 
indicators, countries with score below 5 were calibrated as fully out of the set (0), while 
countries with score above 95 were assigned as fully in the set of a high degree of a certain 
cultural dimension (1). As a crossover point, we chose a score of 50 for each national cultural 
dimension, which is consistent with prior studies’ calibration approach (Fiss, 2011; Judge et 
al., 2014). 
      Institutional Indicators: For the calibration of institutional indicators in our study, we 
followed Hotho’s (2014) method for the fuzzy-set measure of institutional causal conditions in 
both 2004 and 2010. To transform institutional variables into fuzzy-set membership scores, 
firstly we specified three qualitative anchors for each institutional indicator (Ragin, 2008): full 
membership, full non-membership, and the crossover point at which cases are neither fully in 
nor fully out of a given set. In line with recommendations from fuzzy-set method scholars 
(Ragin, 2008; Schneider and Wagemann, 2010), the qualitative anchors are theoretically 
informed where possible. Where theoretical knowledge offers less guidance on cut-off points, 
such as with variables from the World Bank Financial Structure Dataset, we set anchors 
through substantive case knowledge (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010). As Ragin (2008) 
commented, cases with membership scores of exactly 0.5 are difficult to analyse. Thus we 
followed Hotho’s (2014) and Fiss’s (2011) calibration methods for institutional causal 
conditions and deducted 0.05 from the identified crossover points of variables on interval scales. 
For example, the crossover point of State Dominance in 2010 was set at 2.4, and it was then 
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redefined as 2.35. In this study, we calibrated the 2004 and 2010 institutional indicators 
separately, because the scales in our data sources (such as the Global Competitiveness Report) 
are sometimes equivalent but not identical across editions. Then we assigned membership 
scores with the calibration function in the fsQCA 2.5 software, which applies the log odds 
method described in Ragin (2008). This produced a fine-grained calibration of the degree of 
set membership of cases, with scores ranging from 0.00 to 1.00. The detailed anchor points 
used for calibrating institutional indicators were reported in Table 1. 
5. Results 
      We started the analysis by testing whether any of the causal conditions qualified as a 
necessary condition for RIS. The purpose of this step is to identify the presence of any potential 
necessary conditions to be signaled in the subsequent analysis of configurational solutions. In 
fsQCA, a condition is considered “necessary” or “almost always necessary” if the condition is 
required but not necessarily sufficient for an outcome to occur (Schneider et al., 2010; Ragin, 
2008a). As shown in Table 2, we tested whether any of the nine causal conditions was necessary 
to account for national innovation leadership. The results suggested that none of the individual 
conditions exceeded the consistency threshold of 0.90 for a necessary condition (Schneider et 
al., 2010). Therefore, no necessary condition was to be signaled in the subsequent analysis. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
      Table 3 shows the results of fuzzy-set analysis of the causal effect of configurations of both 
cultural and institutional varieties on national innovation leadership. The configurational 
solutions are presented in the style the follows the recommendation of Ragin and Fiss (2008), 
which has been widely adopted in the literature (see Crilly, 2011; Fiss, 2011; Hotho, 2014; 
Ragin, 2008). With regard to the notation, black circles (●) indicate the presence of a condition 
and a circled cross ( ) indicate its absence. Blank spaces indicate ambiguous situations, in 
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which the corresponding causal condition may be either present or absent, and therefore they 
play no significant role in the configurational solution. Following Greckhamer (2011) and 
Ragin (2008), the intermediate solutions generated by fsQCA2.5 were reported, because the 
intermediate solutions are more conservative with stronger empirical plausibility (cf. Ragin, 
2008). In so doing, there are no distinctions between large circles that indicate core conditions 
and small ones as peripheral conditions, which are derived from parsimonious solutions and 
adopted by some studies for serving taxonomy development (e.g., Fiss, 2011; Hotho, 2014). 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
      Two measures of model fits, namely, consistency and coverage, were reported in Table 3. 
The consistency score measures how well the solution corresponds to the data (Crilly, 2011; 
Ragin, 2008). The score is calculated for each configuration separately, and for the whole 
solution. The measure of consistency can range from 0 to 1 (Ragin, 2008a), with a high value 
indicating greater consistency between the theoretical relationship and the actual data. Existing 
studies have adopted various standards for a consistency threshold. For example, several 
studies suggest an acceptable consistency level of 0.80 (Crilly, 2011; Fiss, 2011; Misangyi and 
Acharya, 2014), while Schneider et al. (2010) chose a threshold level of 0.90, and a gap was 
observed in the distribution of consistency scores. Following the latter approach, we applied a 
threshold of 0.955 for the 2011 RIS test and a threshold of 0.986 for the 2005 RIS test.  
      The second fit indicator measures solution coverage. We obtained a coverage of 0.41 with 
solutions for the 2011 RIS test and a coverage of 0.52 for the 2005 RIS test. These overall 
coverage levels indicate the empirical importance of our solutions as a whole (Crilly, 2011; 
Ragin, 2008). Table 3 also reports the raw coverage and unique coverage levels for each 
individual configurational solution. The raw coverage measures the explanatory power of an 
individual configurational solution. However, any single observation might be explained by 
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multiple configurations, and therefore a measure of each configuration’s unique contribution 
to RIS is provided in the form of unique coverage. 
      Based on the Quine-McCluskey algorithm (the method of prime implicants) that gives a 
deterministic way to verify that the minimal form of a Boolean function has been reached, the 
solution table (Table 3) shows that both the 2010-2011 test and the 2004-2005 test generate 
seven configurations. We classified all configurations into three groups, which are mainly 
grounded by the presence of representative case countries. The representative cases were 
derived from a counterfactual analysis to speculate about the most theoretically plausible 
outcomes of the combinations that do not exist in the data set (Crilly, 2011, Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 
2008). Causal combinations of conditions exceeding an appropriate cut-off consistency score 
were categorized as sufficient, and the outcome was therefore assigned a value of 1. Conversely, 
causal combinations with a consistency level below or at the cut-off value were not considered 
sufficient, and the outcome was assigned a value of 0. Setting a frequency threshold of one 
observation is usually advised for a relatively small sample (cf. Crilly, 2011; Ragin, 2008), and 
this is also an operational strategy (cf. Crilly, 2011; Hotho, 2014; Judge et al., 2014) for dealing 
with the limited diversity of combinations (that is, the logically possible causal combination 2k 
possibilities, such as 29 in this study, exceeds the sample size). Cases with set membership 
great than 0.5 were selected. Group I includes countries, such as Sweden (solutions Ia & Ih) 
and Australia (solutions Ib & Ii), which show exactly the same results between the two time 
period tests. Group II contains three countries, namely, the UK (IIc & IIj), Finland (IId & IIk) 
and Ireland (IIe & IIl). Under this group of countries, the three countries retain their national 
innovation leadership among all OECD countries, but their institutional varieties have changed 
in order to maintain innovation competitiveness. Group III represents countries whose national 
innovation configurations have either emerged, such as the Spain model (solution IIIf) and the 
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US model (solution IIIg), or declined, including the Netherlands model (solution IIIm) and the 
Japan model (solution IIIn). Configurations are detailed as follows. 
5.1. Group I: Innovative societies with time robustness 
      Solutions Ia and Ih represent the Swedish innovative model. In this model, the society is 
highly individualistic, and has uncertainty tolerance, non-masculinity, and low power distance 
in its culture gene. Although the country does not have comparatively strong education system, 
nor does it have the state dominance effect, Sweden has high union density, a capital-market-
based financial system and the prevalence of clusters. The finding is consistent with some 
previous studies: for example, Hotho (2014) also showed low direct state involvement and saw 
informal coordination and negotiation among special interest groups. Amable (2003) stated 
that Sweden is a typical social-democratic country, while Boyer’s (2004) classified Sweden as 
a knowledge-based economy.  
      Solutions Ib and Ii reflect Australian society with combined features of a geographically 
isolated democratic economy and an Anglo-Saxon dominated social culture. In its culture, 
Australian society generally prefers uncertainty avoidance, is male-dominated, and is 
individualistic but has low power distance. In its institutions, the country has comparatively 
strong skill training and development systems and an effective capital-market-based financial 
system with low union density, low state dominance and the absence of cluster prevalence. The 
findings support country highlights presented by the Global Competitiveness Report that 
Australia has strong financial market development with public institution excellence, and 
retains its training and education strength, but the labor market is a concern (WEF, 2011, 2014). 
5.2. Group II: Innovative societies with institutional change 
      Solutions IIc and IIj reflect the UK innovative model. In the UK, society accepts 
uncertainty and risk arising from the future unknown aspect, and prefers low power distance, 
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but the society is also a masculinity- and individualism-dominated one. The UK has high union 
density, a strong education system, and prevalent industrial clusters, but its financial system 
remains comparatively reliant on a bank-based credit mechanism, that is, its capital-market-
based system remains relatively weak. State dominance reflects the institutional work 
conducted by the country. Solution IIj shows the configuration does not depend on the element 
of state involvement in 2004-2005, while solution IIc emphasizes an absence of state 
dominance as a causal condition. This is consistent with the institutional structuring literature, 
in which anti-trust regulations and competition policies are considered a major endogenous 
change commonly found in arm’s-length economies (Whitley, 2007). For instance, David 
Cameron’s coalition government (from 2010 to 2016) continued some of the economic policies 
from Tony Blair Labour government (1997-2005), such as supporting the National Minimum 
Wage Act 1998 introduced by the Labour Party, but the Cameron government more firmly 
supported free trade and an open economy, which was evident in less state intervention in the 
economy, such as the deregulation of the private sector, and a reduction in corporate tax to 25% 
and to 20% for small businesses.  
      Solutions IId and IIk illustrate the Finnish model. Finnish society prefers to avoid 
uncertainty but promotes individualism. Also, the society is in favor of gender equality and 
non-power distance. The country has consistent high union density, strong prevalence of 
clusters and less state dominance. For maintaining its national innovation leadership, the 
country has adjusted its institutions, such as the skill training system and financial system (cf., 
solutions IId and IIk). Overall, compared with national educational systems internationally, 
and notwithstanding the Finnish education system has a consistently high ranking, its PISA 
ranking has been displaced from the top in recent years (OECD, 2010). Moreover, according 
to the IMF (2010), there has been a significant increase in the range of deposit-taking 
institutions (commercial, cooperative and savings banks), which stand at the core of Finland’s 
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financial system; and total banking assets were around EUR 350 billion at end-2009 (equivalent 
to about 200% of GDP), up from 110 percent of GDP in 2003. The results of the GFC resulted 
in large dislocations of financial flows in Finland (i.e., occupying 70% of all banking system 
assets), and, as a consequence, the Finish “domestic corporate debt issue fell sharply in 2008 
and was to a large extent replaced by bank credit” (IMF, 2010: 9). This change reduces Finnish 
companies’ financial risk, and to some extent boosts their risk tolerance (or complements their 
uncertainty avoidance as national culture insufficiency for innovation) in innovation activities 
at corporate level.   
      Solutions IIe and IIl reflect the national innovative model of Ireland. Similar to the cultural 
characteristics of the UK model (e,g., IIc and IIj), Irish society prefers uncertainty acceptance, 
masculinity and low power distance with independence and individualistic spirit. The Irish 
business culture has been recommended as a “sophisticated and innovative” one (WEF, 2011: 
24). Supporting Hotho’s (2014) findings, Ireland has demonstrated consistently high union 
density and strong foundation-level education system in building an innovative society. In 
contrast to Hotho (2014), it is found that the presence of state dominance is one of the key 
characteristics of Irish innovative style. The Irish government continued to increase its public 
expenditure and funded expensive capital projects even after the collapse in property-related 
tax revenue that caused the fiscal crisis in Ireland in 2006-2008 (EU, 2012). The institutions of 
society have also changed from 2004-2005 to 2010-2011. The Irish national innovative system 
does not rely on a capital market-based financial system, which is a factor weakening national 
competitiveness (WEF, 2011). Due to the bursting of the Irish property bubble, the post-2008 
Irish banking crisis and the GFC, the country has significantly reformed its banking sector, 
such as deleveraging of bank balance sheets, completing bank mergers and enhancing corporate 
governance (EU, 2012). Another explicit change is related to prevalence of clusters, which 
appeared to be a solid contributor in 2004-2005, but the absence of that element is important 
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in 2010-2011. It is evident that the government has reformed sectoral labor market agreements, 
and made on-going efforts to encourage more competition in “sheltered” clusters, such as the 
legal professions, thus bringing down costs and stimulating a competitive economy (EU, 2012).  
5.3. Group III: Innovative societies with transformational features  
      Solutions IIIf and IIIg represent two “emerging” innovative societies during the test 
window period, Spain and the US, respectively. Spanish society culture is characterized by 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, gender equality and high power distance. In its 
institutional features, the country emphasizes education, shown in the large proportion of the 
population that pursues higher education (WEF, 2014), and state involvement in economic 
policies, such as a notable effort towards public investment in infrastructure (WEF, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the absence of union density, a capital market based financial system and cluster 
prevalence are important contributors. The innovativeness of the Spanish society is echoed in 
Hotho’s (2014) findings. The emergence of the Spanish model reflects the extensive economic 
restructuring, knowledge adoption and liberalization processes in the 1990s (Hotho, 2014; 
WEF, 2011).  
      The US has dominated in a number of radical innovation events (e.g., personal computers, 
biotechnology, and the internet) since World War II. However, our fsQCA analysis, a 
counterfactual analysis in particular, does not highlight the country in the 2004-2005 test 
compared with other countries, but does show the society in the 2010-2011 test. We therefore 
classified the American society as an “emerging one”. This emergence can be understood as a 
lack of macroeconomic stability that continues to be the US’ “greatest area of weakness” (cf. 
WEF, 2011: 23; WEF, 2014). The society features in risk taking, masculinity, individualism 
and low power distance in its culture, and low union density (e.g., “the ease and affordability 
of hiring workers and significant wage flexibility” (WEF, 2011: 14)); it is comparatively weak 
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in its equity-orientated skill development system (that is, on the contrary it promotes an “elite” 
education system), a strong capital-market-based financial system, and strong state dominance 
in the economy in its institutions.   
      Solutions IIIm and IIIn indicate two countries, the Netherlands and Japan, in the 2004-2005 
test, but they did not appear again in the 2010-2011 test. We therefore term the two national 
innovation configurations as “transient” ones. Dutch society features uncertainty avoidance, 
gender equality, individualism and low power distance in its culture, while Japanese society is 
embedded in a culture of uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, collectivism and high power 
distance. Among the five institutional indicators, both the Netherlands and Japan models 
demonstrate only one element (i.e., skill development for the Netherlands and prevalence of 
clusters for Japan) as a key contributor, and all the other four indicators remain absent.  By 
contrast, all the other five solutions, either in 2004-2005 or in 2010-2011, show at least two 
institutional elements as key contributors. This sole presence type of instructional structure 
might support the two countries in maintaining national innovative competitiveness during 
global economic boom periods (e.g., 2000-2005), but cannot survive or work efficiently in a 
turbulent economic and social environment, such as the GFC.   
      In summary, the resultant configurational solutions shown in Table 3 support our 
propositions. Overall, the consistency scores demonstrate the presence of a clear set-theoretic 
relationship. In other words, there is a clear nexus of cultural and institutional varieties working 
in configurations, rather than in isolation, to enable RIS. A closer look at the configurational 
solutions suggests that all solutions involve at least one causal condition from either Hofstede’s 
four culture dimensions or comparative institutional indicators. Therefore, we find support for 
the proposition that the collective influence of cultural and institutional varieties explains 
OECD countries’ efforts in building an innovative society. Proposition 1 is supported. 
Moreover, we find multiple configurational solutions for achieving high RIS performance. This 
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indicates that an innovative society can be achieved by multiple cultural and institutional 
configurations. The presence of the three overall groups of solutions thus points to a situation 
of across-type, equifinality of solutions (e.g., Fiss, 2011). Proposition 2 is supported. Further, 
building upon Shane (1992, 1993, 1995) and Furman et al. (2002), our findings suggest that 
there is no one best way to configure an innovative society, and a high RIS performance can 
be secured by relying on its culture roots, adjusting and developing its institutional varieties. 
For example, Group II solutions indicate that countries can proactively or passively change 
their institutions in order to maintain their innovative flagship, although their culture varieties 
cannot be changed in the short run, while Group III solutions demonstrate that countries with 
certain culture-institutional configurations might not be able to consistently protect their 
national innovation competitiveness. Such dynamism confirms our Proposition 3.  
6. Discussion 
6.1.Implications for the theory 
      Scientific research has generated numerous insights as to why any individual or 
organization is more innovative than others, yet the lasting puzzle – why some societies enjoy 
comparative advantages in high-tech sectors – has not been fully addressed, and remains an 
important topic for social scientists. Our study addresses this question, and provides some 
important theoretical implications.  
      First, compared with culturists’ efforts (e.g., Shane, 1993, 1995), our findings show that 
the other two key culture dimensions, namely, uncertainty avoidance vs. acceptance, and 
masculinity vs. femineity, are contributing factors in several configurations (e.g., solutions Ib, 
IIIn), but not in others (e.g., solution Ia). This finding resolves some debates on the inclusion 
of these culture dimensions for anticipating an innovative society in the literature. For example, 
scholars (cf. Rinne et al., 2012; Shane, 1993, 1995) hold different opinions as to whether 
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uncertainty acceptance is necessary for being an innovative nation. Based on the 
configurational approach and a set-logic, our finding suggests that all these culture indicators 
are contributory and configurational, but not in a linear fashion assumed by previous regression 
analyses.  
      Second, in addition to the comparative institutional thinking, this study adds cultural 
dimensions to account for national innovation performance. The resulting representative case 
countries identified are largely consistent with Hotho (2014). For example, case countries in 
our study, such as Sweden, Australia, the UK, Finland, Ireland and the US, are also high-level 
national innovation representative countries in the study by Hotho (2014). Hotho (2014: 21) 
promotes the Nordic business system, which features “low direct state involvement, high trust, 
a strong public training system and considerable cooperation and coordination across actors”. 
Our findings also demonstrate that two of seven solutions in the two rounds of tests are from 
the Nordic countries, Sweden and Finland. However, given the configurational equifinality 
(Fiss, 2007, 2011; Gresov and Drazin, 1997), we argue that, when countries face multiple and 
sometimes conflicting cultural and institutional varieties which require prioritizing to obtain an 
achievable outcome level (i.e., national innovation performance), countries differ in their 
functional prioritization, which leads to different configurations that may generate the same or 
similar levels of outcome. Therefore, our study seeks to downplay the superiority of the Nordic 
business system claimed by Hotho (2014); rather it contends that the Nordic business system 
(i.e., the Swedish and Finish configurations in this study) is just one of the alternative paths 
that produces, reproduces and transforms national innovation outcomes. Based on the 
equifinality and our empirical findings, it is evident that the Anglo-Saxon model (such as the 
UK, Ireland, Australia and the US) is also equally effective in leading to building an innovative 
society.  
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      Third, the comparative institutional perspective argues for sector-specific comparative 
advantages. For example, CMEs might be good at incremental innovation, while LME 
countries are strong in radical innovation (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall and Gingerich, 2009); 
likewise, CMEs export more heavily in medium high-tech industries and LMEs in high-tech 
industries (Schneider et al., 2010; Cui et al., 2016). All these findings are based on a static view 
of comparative institutional perspective. Our Group III countries, such as the presence of Spain 
and the US in 2010-2011, the presence of the Netherlands and Japan in 2004-2005, and the 
disappearance of these countries in another round of tests, clearly indicate that institutional 
varieties are not enduring social patterns. Similar to Schneider and Paunescu (2012), our 
findings also show mixed evidence for the comparative institutional claims made by Hall and 
Soskice (2001). Based on our findings, we argue that the theoretical development of 
comparative institutional perspective should enhance its theoretical explanation power for 
institutional dynamism.  
6.2.Implications for policymakers 
      This study uses a fuzzy-set approach to explore the combinations of Hofstede’s culture 
dimensions and the comparative institutional varieties that enable some OECD countries to 
achieve higher national innovation performance than others. This study contributes to both 
international business and innovation policy by providing three key findings. First, we confirm 
that culture and institutions co-evolve and affect each other in a path-dependent way. 
Institutions need to be complemented by culture to be able to increase innovation and vice 
versa. Second, we show that the end result of the evolutionary process is a distinct 
configuration of culture and institutions for each society. Some configurations are better suited 
for producing innovative activities in high-tech sectors than others. This suggests that 
combinations of culture and institutions follow a set logic rather than the conditional 
effectiveness implied by Taylor and Wilson (2012). Third, we show that the configurations do 
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change as the evolutionary process proceeds, stimulated by external shock. When a causal 
condition is absent, the country may no longer be able to maintain its comparative advantage 
in innovation as before. We suggest that societies can adjust or develop their cultural and/or 
institutional conditions to maintain or create their innovation leadership. 
6.3.Implications for practices 
      In addition to the solutions detailed in the last section, there are several findings worth 
mentioning. First, among all 14 configurations, 13 contain the presence of individualism and 
the absence of power distance as key contributors to being innovative societies; the only two 
exceptions are the Spanish model in 2010-2011 (solution IIIf) with power distance and the 
Japanese model (solution IIIn) in 2004-2005 with collectivism. The consistency of findings 
largely supports Shane’s (1992) arguments, that is, a society that stresses social hierarchy 
discourages innovative activities, while individualistic societies are more innovative than 
collectivistic ones. For example, in individualist societies, the purpose of getting an education 
is to learn how to learn, while the purpose of education in collectivist societies is to learn how 
to do (Hofstede et al., 2010; Rinne et al., 2012). According to Rinne et al. (2012), in a world in 
which technology is rapidly changing, individualistic societies that emphasise learning how to 
learn may put such nations in a better position, because members are constantly needing new 
skills, and this in turn fosters innovation. Unsurprisingly, the appearance of collectivism in the 
Japan model (solution IIIn) also supports findings from Taylor and Wilson (2012), that is, 
collectivism in certain situations may actually foster national innovation rates.  
        Further, the seven solutions derived from both the 2010-2011 test and the 2004-2005 test 
also appear relatively robust over time, which confirms some findings from Hotho (2014). The 
robustness mainly reflects culture dimension consistency in terms of measurement and being 
severed as complementary conditions, and the overall representative case countries of Group I 
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and II solutions. Group I countries, such as Sweden and Australia, show their own identical 
solutions over time. This is consistent with Whitley’s (2007) proposition that strong and 
complementary governance relations among domestic actors can withstand external shocks and 
remain effective in providing the institutional resources required for innovation. Although 
Group II countries, such as the UK, Finland and Ireland, maintain their national innovation 
leadership, the fsQCA analysis captures the relative changes in their institutional characteristics. 
The finding provides empirical evidence to the institutional change theory, which, at a more 
macro level, argues that efforts are influenced by social movements and entail the fundamental 
realignment of a significant number of participants’ frames and logics of action (Seo and Creed, 
2002). In this context, institutional change happens when the weakening and disappearance of 
one set of beliefs and practices is associated with the arrival of new beliefs and practices (Dacin 
et al., 2002). The fact that some countries need to adjust their institutional arrangements to 
sustain their competitive position while others do not suggests that the consequences of 
exogenous environmental changes are not universal and may depend on the complementarity 
of extant institutions (Whitley, 2007). Those countries with less cohesive associations among 
interest groups, like employers and labour organizations, may have to adapt to the new 
environment in order to consolidate the value of the domestically provided “collective 
competition goods” and thus maintain an internationally competitive position.  
6.4.Limitations and future research 
        Some limitations of the study need to be acknowledged, but these nevertheless indicate 
potential directions for future research. First, the “limited diversity” issue – an intrinsic 
limitation of the fuzzy set methods (Crilly et al., 2012; Ragin, 2008) – is a potential threat to 
internal validity of our research. Unlike regression-based analyses, control variables cannot be 
included in fsQCA in a conventional sense, and the total number of causal conditions is limited 
by the sample size. We follow Ragin (2008) in deriving causal conditions from existing theories, 
32 
 
 
 
and only select high-order, i.e., the most important, ones. Specifically, we set a frequency 
threshold of one observation in our truth table analysis. Although our choice of causal 
conditions leads to parsimonious theory building, it could cause potential threats of “limited 
diversity” insufficiency. Therefore we call for future studies to include more causal conditions 
wherever possible and further test the validity of our findings.  
        Second, our focus on national innovation among advanced economies (e.g., OECD 
member countries) may pose a threat to external validity. As mentioned in the methods section, 
although we study the whole “population” of OECD countries, rather than a randomly selected 
“sample”, the data source availability across years limits the total number of countries included. 
Therefore, the sample size cannot generate sufficient empirical cases (29) to cover theoretical 
possibilities. Given this limitation, future study can either conduct analyses on alternative 
causal conditions by using different theoretical lenses as an extension to the current study for 
national innovation research, or repeat our research design in a sample of developing countries. 
In so doing, the generalizability of the findings might be enhanced, and both approaches call 
for new theory building other than comparative capitalism.   
        Third, this study is limited to exploring country-level innovation performance. We have 
identified several countries with national innovation excellence. The managerial implication of 
the findings is that these countries might be the best locations for research and development 
for multinational corporations and even the entire human society (cf. Shane, 1992). We also 
agree with scholars (e.g., Jackson and Deeg, 2008; Schneider et al., 2010) who argue for the 
relation between country-level competitiveness and organizations’ institutional arbitrage. We 
further add the possibility of the cultural arbitrage concept for firm-level studies, because 
culture is configurational and leads to culture competitive advantages (cf. Shane, 1992, 1993). 
The identification of national innovation excellence among advanced economies may be 
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explored by using the (institutional/culture) arbitrage perspective to connect with 
organizational-level research in the future. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This study explores configurational solutions leading to higher national innovation 
performance among OECD member countries in the high-technology sectors. Embraced with 
a crossvergence perspective, the study involves four cultural dimension based and five 
institution related causal conditions and investigates the three propositions with two rounds of 
data. Our results identify three groups of highly innovative societies, namely, Australia and 
Sweden as innovative countries with time robustness; the UK, Finland and Ireland changing 
some institutional settings to maintain as innovative societies;  Spain, the US, Netherlands and 
Japan as being innovative societies once at certain time points due to transformational features. 
The study confirms the equal importance of both cultural and institutional mechanisms as 
contributors to national cutting edge innovation, and identifies equifinal configurations of 
cultural and institutional varieties as leading to a high-tech society. In addition, if cultural and 
institutional varieties are configurational, a society can adjust or develop cultural and/or 
institutional conditions to maintain or create leadership in innovation. 
        There are a number of practical and theoretical implications of this study, as discussed in 
the discussion section above. In particular, this study emphasizes on the configurational 
thinking of creating /disrupting and maintaining innovative societies. Moreover, from a 
crossvergence perspective, the study pioneers in bringing both culture and institutional 
varieties to study national innovation systems, rather than just focus on the impact of either 
cultural dimensions or political and economic institutions on national innovation performance. 
Given some limitations, such as, only sampling advanced economies, we urge the need for 
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further research to explore the crossvergence perspective of cultural and institutional varieties 
and their impact on national innovation performance in developing economies.   
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Table 1: Measurement and Calibration 
Type Variable Measurement & Data Source 
Calibration 
Anchors (04-
05/10-11) 
Fuzzy 
Sets  
Measure Descriptives (04-05/10-11) 
Mean SD Max Min 
Outcome 
Revealed 
Innovation 
Specialization 
(RIS) 
Proxied by Balassa index of RIS in biotechnology, 
nanotechnology, and information and communication 
technology using 2005/2011 patent data from 
OECD/EPO patent database, based on Hotho’s (2014) 
measurement of innovation specialization. 
0, 0.57, 0.82, 1.08 
4 
0.78 0.31 1.44 0.21 
0, 0.59, 0.82, 1.04 0.82 0.27 1.34 0.31 
Culture 
Indicators 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance index of national culture,  
adopted from Hofstede (1980), and Hofstede, Hofstede, 
& Minkov (2010) 
5, 50, 95 3 
64.65 24.69 112 23 
65.83 22.00 100 23 
Masculinity 
Masculinity index of national culture, adopted from 
Hofstede (1980), and Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov 
(2010) 
5, 50, 95 3 
50.30 23.91 95 5 
52.17 25.15 100 5 
Individualism 
Individualism index of national culture, adopted from 
Hofstede (1980), and Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov 
(2010) 
5, 50, 95 3 
64.96 19.03 91 27 
62.73 19.06 91 18 
Power Distance 
Power distance index of national culture, adopted from 
Hofstede (1980), and Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov 
(2010) 
5, 50, 95 3 
43.26 18.02 81 11 
46.53 19.76 100 11 
Institutional 
Indicators 
Union Density 
Net union membership as a proportion of employed 
wage and salary earners, based on Visser’s (2013) 
measure. Data are collected from ICTWSS Database 4.0, 
April 2013. 
15.6, 25.2, 34.8 
3 
31.35 20.57 76.9 7.8 
15.6, 26.1, 36.6 28.93 20.61 79.4 5.9 
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Strength of 
Education System 
The percentage of variance in student performance 
attributable to differences among schools (intra-class 
correlation coefficient), based on Hotho’s (2014) 
measure. Data are collected from OECD Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) database 2000 
and 2009. The OECD Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) develops three-yearly 
surveys that examine 15-year-old students’ 
performance in reading, mathematics, and science.  
36.3, 24.85, 13.4 
3 
32.07 17.50 58 4.8 
46.1, 32.3, 18.5 37.15 17.51 66.8 8.7 
Market 
Capitalization to 
Credit 
Market capitalization to GDP divided by private credit 
provided by deposit money banks to GDP, following 
Hotho’s (2014) measure. Data on market capitalization 
obtained from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators & Global Development Finance database 
2011. Data on private credit by deposit money banks 
obtained from the World Bank Financial Structure 
dataset 2013. 
0.6, 0.995, 1.4 
3 
0.95 0.56 2.51 0.28 
0.51, 0.795, 1.09 0.69 0.56 2.44 0.10 
Prevalence of 
Cluster 
Following Hotho (2014), this variable is measured by the 
pervasiveness of clusters, including research institutes 
and training providers, on a scale from 1 to 7. Data are 
collected from Global Competitiveness Report 2004-
2005 and 2010-2011. 
3.6, 4.15, 4,7 
3 
4.22 0.72 5.5 2.8 
4.1, 4.55, 5.1 4.33 0.74 5.5 2.9 
State Dominance 
A combined measure of the independence of government 
policies, and the degree of selectivity associated with 
state aid and subsidies, based on Hotho’s (2014) 
measurement. Data are collected from Global 
Competitiveness Report 2004-2005 and 2010-2011. 
1.8, 2,18, 2,65 
3 
2.25 0.71 3.55 1.3 
1,95, 2.35, 2.85 2.62 0.82 3.95 1.1 
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Table 2: Necessary Conditions a 
 RIS in Year 2011b RIS in Year 2005b 
Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
Uncertainty Avoidance 0.70 0.57 0.69 0.55 
Masculinity 0.57 0.58 0.62 0.62 
Individualism 0.78 0.64 0.87 0.66 
Power Distance 0.53 0.64 0.50 0.63 
Union Density 0.51 0.67 0.64 0.67 
Skill Development 0.44 0.70 0.65 0.73 
Market Capitalization to Credit 0.39 0.59 0.47 0.63 
Prevalence of Cluster 0.51 0.66 0.74 0.72 
State Dominance 0.59 0.57 0.44 0.49 
                                       
            Note: a Necessary conditions are calculated with the fsQCA 2.5 software. 
                                  b RIS is calculated as 1 year time lag with casual conditions.  
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Table 3: Configurations for RIS a  
Note:  a Following Ragin (2008), only intermediate solutions are reported. 
           b Black circles indicate the presence of a condition, and circles with “X” indicate its absence.  Blank spaces indicate “don’t care”. 
           c **sign refers to the identical solutions between 2004 and 2010, while * sign means similar or compatible solutions between 2004 and 2010.   
Configuration c 
  Solution for 2011b  Solution for 2005b 
Ia** Ib** IIc* IId* IIe* IIIf IIIg Ih** Ii** IIj* IIk* IIl* IIIm IIIn 
Culture Indicators     
Uncertainty Avoidance  ●  ●  ●   ●  ●  ● ● 
Masculinity  ● ●  ●  ●  ● ●  ●  ● 
Individualism ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
Power Distance 
     ●        ● 
Institutional Indicators   
Union Density ●  ● ● ●   ●  ● ● ●   
Skill Development  ● ●  ● ●   ● ● ● ● ●  
Market Capitalization to Credit ● ●     ● ● ●  ●    
Prevalence of Cluster ●  ● ●   ● ●  ● ● ●  ● 
State Dominance 
    ● ● ●     ●   
  
Consistency 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Raw Coverage 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.23 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.11 
Unique Coverage 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.05 
Case Country 
Sweden Australia UK Finland Ireland Spain US Sweden Australia UK Finland Ireland Netherlands Japan 
Overall Solution Consistency 0.97 0.99 
Overall Solution Coverage 0.41 0.52 
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Appendix 1: Theoretical Background  
A: The relationship between Hofstede’s culture dimensions and national innovation 
      Uncertainty avoidance concerns how societies cope with the unknown aspect of the future. 
Hofstede (1980) adopts three key indicators to assess the dimension, namely, rule orientation, 
employment stability and stress, and he argues that uncertainty-accepting societies are more 
tolerant of changes and risk taking (often associated with innovative activities) than people in 
uncertainty-avoiding ones. However, empirical findings on the impact of uncertainty avoidance 
on innovation have been inconclusive. Shane (1993, 1995) finds evidence that an acceptance 
of uncertainty appears to be necessary for a nation to be innovative. Nevertheless, those 
findings do not indicate a clear relationship between uncertainty avoidance and the per capita 
rate of invention across societies (Shane, 1992). Neither is this evident in the empirical study 
by Rinne and colleagues (2012).  
      Masculinity, together with its opposite pole Femininity as the duality of the sexes, is related 
to “a fundamental fact with which different societies cope in different ways” (Hofstede, 1980: 
176). A masculinity orientated culture values self-assertiveness, independence and career (such 
as achievement, promotion, and competition), as opposed to feminine values, that include 
relationships, modesty, tolerance, the quality of life and physical working conditions (Hofstede 
et al., 2010; Nakata & Sivakumar, 1996). It has been argued that innovation is motivated by 
financial rewards, prestige, and a sense of accomplishment (Shim, 2011; Quinn, 1979). In 
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masculine societies, the ambitious, assertive and risk-taking dominating societal values 
promote innovation and an entrepreneurship spirit (Shim, 2011). However, the empirical 
evidence has challenged this intuitive view. For instance, Shane (1993) demonstrated that 
masculinity has no effect on the number of trademarks per capita. Nakta and Sivakumar (1996) 
argue that those feminine societies focusing on “people” can provide a supportive climate, low 
conflict, trust and a socio-emotional support environment, all of which are critical for new ideas 
incubation and implementation.  
      Individualism is defined as a preference for a loosely-knit social structure in which 
individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families (Hofstede 
et al., 2010). In Hofstede’s (1980) original assessment, the measurement of individualism 
involves six aspects: freedom, a cosmopolitan orientation of a society, autonomy, reward 
incentives, goal achieving environment and psychological characteristics. Shane (1992, 1993) 
demonstrates that individualistic societies are more inventive and innovative than collectivistic 
ones, because these key values, such as freedom, an outward orientation and getting senior 
managers’ support, can stimulate creativity. Rinne et al. (2012) also find that individualism is 
strongly and positively related to innovation, and the key values, such as autonomy, 
independence and freedom are requisite for a nation to be innovative. While supporting the 
significant role of individualism in national innovation, Taylor and Wilson (2012) also point 
47 
 
 
 
out that collectivism, in certain situations (e.g., as part of patriotism or nationalism) can have 
an almost as strong positive effect as individualism on innovation rates.  
      Power distance refers to the extent to which society members create the unequal 
distribution of power in organisations. Hofstede (1980) argues that human inequality is 
inevitable and functional in each organisation and society. Inequality is reflected in how 
different societies have found solutions to deal with attitudes towards prestige, wealth and 
power. Hofstede’s (1980) power distance index (PDI) adopts seven key measures: the 
desirability of hierarchy, information communication, centralization, control over subordinates, 
detailed instruction to subordinates, fatalism or weak work ethic, and the unwillingness of 
accept change in power distribution. Previous studies generally take the view that lower PDI 
societies encourage innovation at the organisational level than do higher PDI ones. In Bessant 
and Grunt’s (1985) study, successful innovation in both British and German manufacturing 
firms is associated with shared responsibilities and consultative management decision-making 
process. By examining data on the per capita number of trademarks granted to nationals of 33 
countries in the US and world markets in 1975 and 1980, Shane (1993) concludes that less 
power-distant societies are more innovative than more power-distant societies. The finding is 
also supported by Rinne et al. (2012), who adopted the Global Innovation Index (GII) as the 
measurement of national innovation. 
 
48 
 
 
 
B: The relationship between comparative institutional dimensions and national 
innovation 
      Union Density refers to net union membership as a proportion of employed wage and salary 
earners, which can capture the strength of independent trade unions (Visser, 2013). Based on 
the comparative institutional perspective, high employment protection (e.g., strong barriers to 
or high cost of dismissing employees through the termination of employment contracts) 
characterises CME countries, but not LME countries (Whitley, 1998, 1999). Employment 
protection against dismissal in bad faith is necessary to effectively motivate and nurture 
innovation. For instance, in studying wrongful dismissal laws in the US and their impact on 
innovation, Acharya, Baghai and Subramanian (2012) argue that employment protection 
practices and regulations, particularly those that protect employees from termination in bad 
faith, foster innovation. Manso (2011) suggests that employment contracts that tolerate failure 
(in other words, provide protection in case of failure) in the short run and maintain job security 
and reward success in the long run best motivate innovation. Among others, empirical studies 
show that the presence of strong unions and centralized wage bargaining is one of the paths 
toward high innovation performance (e.g., Hotho, 2014), and lax employment protection does 
not appear to be an important feature in contributing to the export performance of high-tech 
sectors (e.g., Schneider et al., 2010).  
      Skill Development refers to the skill training and education system that aims to generate 
high-quality human resources, especially scientific, technical and managerial personnel. An 
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educational system can secure a continuous supply of scientists – a crucial resource for 
companies in a high-technology industry (Schneider et al., 2010). Furman, Porter and Stern 
(2002: 904) point out that “without skilled scientists and engineers operating in an environment 
with access to cutting-edge technology, it is unlikely that a country will produce an appreciable 
amount of new-to-the-world innovative output”. Moreover, the considerable international 
variation in the skill development system (including both general and specific skill training) is 
attributable to the differences in R&D manpower as inputs in the innovation process (Furman 
et al., 2002).  
      Market Capitalization to Credit is a ratio of market capitalization to GDP divided by the 
ratio of private credit extended by deposit money banks to GDP (Hotho, 2014). It reflects the 
relative importance of two distinct sources of capital in the financial systems: firms’ 
dependence on bank loans and the use of the stock market (Monnet & Quintin, 2007). A fluid 
stock market diversifies risks, which is often considered to be a precondition for national 
systems of innovation (Schneider et al., 2010). Also, an ample supply of risk-tolerance capital 
is a determinant of national innovation capacity building, because the availability of risk capital 
can translate scientific and technological outputs into economic opportunities for further 
innovation and commercialization (Furman et al., 2002). The comparative institutional 
perspective suggests that that reliance on stock market (i.e., equity) is a more dominant feature 
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in LME countries, while firms originating from CME countries rely more on bank financing 
(i.e., debt) (Schneider et al., 2010). 
      Prevalence of Clusters creates agglomeration economies, which lead to network 
externalities, and which, in turn, generate spatial concentration of particular value-added 
activities within specific locales (Porter, 1990). Porter (1990) argues that clusters have the 
potential to affect competition in three ways: by driving innovation in the field, by increasing 
the productivity of the companies in the cluster, and by stimulating new businesses in the field. 
Cluster development has since become a focus for many government programs. However, 
although industry clusters  (such as Silicon Valley in the US, and Digital Media City in South 
Korea) and intermediary associations can promote significant collaborating effects on 
innovation and foster regional economic development, they also increase entry barriers to a 
particular industry or regional economy, and to some extent they demotivate free market 
competition (Krugman, 1991). Therefore the state’s tolerance of cluster development and 
intermediate associations between the state and firms is one of the most important aspects of 
the state in influencing different forms of economic organizations (Whitley, 1999). 
      State Dominance refers to the strength of the state in relation to special-interest groups and 
the role of the state in the development of economic activity (Hotho, 2014; Whitley, 1999). 
The impact of the state can be traced back to the early stage of the comparative institutional 
perspective (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999). The strength of the state in relation to 
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special-interest groups is captured in the independence of government policies from special 
interest groups, while the role of the state in the development of economic activity is embedded 
in the extent to which government subsidies promote fair competition (Hotho, 2014). State 
dominance has an impact on the national innovation system (Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 2007; 
Samara, et al., 2012). For example, as Landes has said (1970: 151), “the government provided 
technical advice and assistance, awarded subventions to inventors and immigrant entrepreneurs, 
bestowed gifts of machinery, allowed rebates and exemptions of duties on imports of industrial 
equipment”. In addition, it is commonly recognized that monopolies stifle innovation, because 
the lack of competition consolidates and protects a company’s dominant market position, rather 
than encouraging the creation of revolutionary products and services (Riordan, 2005). 
Therefore, the effectiveness of anti-trust policy and non-favoritism in governance decisions are 
crucial to create an encouraging environment for national innovation system. 
 
 
 
 
